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 Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the impact of recorded domestic property crime on property prices in the 
London area.  Crimes in the Criminal Damage category have a significant negative impact on 
prices.  Burglaries have no measurable impact on prices, even after allowing for the potential 
dependence of burglary rates on unobserved property characteristics.  A one-tenth standard 
deviation decrease in the local density of criminal damage adds 1% to the price of an average 
Inner London property.  One explanation we offer here is that vandalism, graffiti and other 
forms of criminal damage motivate fear of crime in the community and may be taken as 
signals or symptoms of community instability and neighbourhood deterioration in general 
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1. Introduction 
 
Urban crime has a powerful influence on perceptions of area deprivation. Criminal damage to 
public and private property symbolises urban decay, and fear of burglary and theft promotes 
insecurity and anxiety. Crime prevention and control policy is top of the political agenda in 
developed countries, and these problems are particularly acute in the urban environment. 
Although no place is crime-free, the fear of crime and the direct costs associated with 
property crime can have particularly severe consequences in urban areas, in discouraging 
local regeneration and catalysing a downward spiral in neighbourhood status. This ‘tipping’ 
process has a prominent role in criminological explanations of community change and crime 
(Bottoms and Wiles, 1997). Policy makers in Britain apparently share this view, arguing that 
“neighbourhoods have been stuck in a spiral of decline. Areas with high crime and 
unemployment rates acquired poor reputations, so people, shops and employers left. As 
people moved out, high turnover and empty homes created more opportunities for crime, 
vandalism and drug dealing” (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p.7). Certainly, casual observation 
suggests that persistently high local crime rates deters new residents and motivates those who 
can to move out to lower-crime rate neighbourhoods. We would expect this demand for low-
crime neighbourhoods to be revealed in a property or land price gradient between residences 
in high and low-crime localities. 
The evidence from the US based on hedonic models (Hellman and Naroff, 1979; 
Thaler, 1978; Lynch and Rasmussen, 2001) suggests that crime rates do affect property 
values, although the effects may be small below high-crime thresholds. Lynch and 
Rasmussen (2001) find that a 1% increase in violent crime rates reduces prices by 0.05%, but 
report positive associations of property crime rates with prices. This they attribute to higher 
reporting rates in wealthier neighbourhoods, but higher victimisation rates may provide a 
better explanation. Properties are heavily discounted in high-crime neighbourhoods. For the 
UK, however, there is no existing evidence on the relationship between urban crime and 
property values. We address this here by estimating the effect that crime rates have on 
property prices in the Inner London area, using spatial property crime data provided by the 
Metropolitan Police. Following the traditional hedonic literature, we interpret this as 
measuring households’ marginal willingness to pay to avoid crime, or the implicit costs of 
crime. 
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One problem with existing studies is that identification relies on inclusion of an ad-hoc 
set of control variables at the household and neighbourhood levels. No attempt has been 
made to deal with the potential endogeneity of crime rates in a property value model. In this 
paper we deal carefully with this issue. We apply a semi-parametric regression approach that 
is useful for abstracting from unobserved price variation induced by access to local amenities 
and changes in the unobserved physical characteristics of property over geographical space. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out the empirical framework 
for our estimates, and goes into some detail on how we think we can identify the impact of 
crime density on property values. Section 3 discusses our data sources. Section 4 presents the 
results, and discusses their interpretation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Empirical Model and Methods 
 
Our task is to measure the impact that property-based crimes in the neighbourhood have on 
the price of residential property. But this highlights a general problem with the use of 
property value models to infer the implicit price of local characteristics that reflect the 
behaviour of local residents. Clearly, the behaviour of neighbours will depend on their 
individual characteristics, and these may well be systematically related to unobserved 
determinants of property prices. Consequently we may falsely infer a causal relationship 
between local characteristics and property prices, when in fact it is the unobserved 
component of property values that drives neighbourhood composition. Consider this 
example: low local land prices attract low-income residents, and if low-income residents are 
prone to commit crimes in their own neighbourhood we will find more crime in low land-
price neighbourhoods. Unless we can observe land prices, regression estimates of the impact 
of crime on property prices will be biased towards finding a negative relationship. 
On the other hand, estimation of the implicit price of crime presents an additional 
problem. Burglars will target properties where the expected return in terms of the market 
value of stolen goods is highest. Since high land-price neighbourhoods will have high 
proportions of high- income residents, the returns to burglary in high land-price 
neighbourhoods will be high. We can expect to find high burglary rates in these areas, other 
things equal. To proceed, we must pay careful attention to the unobserved components of 
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property values that are area specific, and attempt to control for these in our estimation 
technique. 
To understand and tackle the problem, we need to structure what we are doing fairly 
carefully. We assume the following structure for the joint determination of crimes and 
property prices: 
 
( )ln | ,i i i i i iP ßx z m u c h vg ¢= + + +  (1) 
( ) ( )| , | ,i i i i i i i ix m x c h z m u c h vr d l s e¢= + + + +  (2) 
 
Equation (1) says that the log-price of property i  is dependent on the incidence of 
property crimes in the neighbourhood surrounding the property ix , a vector of exogenous 
property and location characteristics iz , plus spatially correlated unobserved components iu  
and a random error term iv . Equation (2) says that crimes in the neighbourhood of a property 
depend on crimes in the broader geographical area ( )ii hcxm ,| , on the observed property and 
location characteristics iz , on the unobserved property and location characteristics 
( )ii hcum ,| , iv , and on a random error term ie . The function ( )| ,i im c hx  represents a locally 
weighted average of x , with weights on each observation determined by their distance from 
the location ic  of observation i, with the distance-decay rate determined by a pre-set 
bandwidth parameter ih . We can think of this as the expected value of a random variable x  
in the broader geographical area of observation i, and it captures the impact of location and 
local amenities. 
In more detail, the unobservable components in the property price equation (1) are as 
follows. Firstly, ( )ii hcum ,|  represents factors jointly influencing crime and the prices of 
properties in the broader geographical area – let us call this the district. A prime example is 
the land price, which determines property prices, the supply of criminals and the expected 
returns to crime in the area. Parameter 0¹l  in equation (2) implies that crimes in the district 
and average district property prices are jointly determined. Secondly, error term iv  represents 
factors jointly influencing the price of a specific property or properties in its immediate 
neighbourhood and criminal activity at that same location. We might think of large windows 
or secluded gardens that make a residential area attractive to both burglars and home-buyers, 
or poorly maintained property that attracts vandals and a low market price. For example, it is 
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known that victimisation rates vary with type of household and so in principle with types of 
property (Tseloni, Osborn et al., 2002). Hence, recorded crime rates will be endogenous to 
housing prices unless all housing attributes are observed. So, parameter 0¹s  in equation (2) 
implies that crimes at the property or in the immediate neighbourhood and the property price 
are jointly determined. 
In the crime equation, parameter r  measures the dependence of criminal activity in the 
neighbourhood at a given property location on criminal activity in the surrounding district. 
This might arise for instance through opportunistic burglaries or vandalism in a street by 
criminals targeting nearby areas. We allow for spatial correlation in crime rates, since this 
provides one potential source of identification, as we shall see below. 
 
2.1. Identification of the impact of crime on property prices 
 
As it stands, OLS estimation of the hedonic price function in (1) produces inconsistent 
estimates, because of the correlation between ix  and the unobserved price components, 
implied by 0, ¹ls . Let us assume for a start that we can proxy the important local 
determinants of property prices by some parametric function of observable characteristics 
(distance to the central business district, local amenities and the like), such that 
( )| , 0i im u c h = . Parameters estimated in (1) by OLS will still be inconsistent, because we have 
not dealt with the fact that unobserved property characteristics may determine crime rates in 
the immediate neighbourhood ( 0¹s ). But we can obtain consistent estimates by a standard 
Instrumental Variables estimator, using the spatial lags of crime, ( )ii hcxm ,| , as instruments, 
since ( )| | , , 0i i i iE v m x c h zé ù =ë û  by assumption. The intuition here is that if reported crime 
density at a given property location is higher because of unobservable attributes of the 
properties, then the expected number of crimes in the wider district is a suitable instrument – 
but only once we’ve removed spatial correlation in the unobserved determinants of property 
prices1. 
                                                 
1 Note that crime density ix  at each location depends on a weighted average of crime densities at other 
locations ( )ii hcxm ,| . Hence, ix  itself contributes to ( )ii hcxm ,|  through other observations’ spatial lags, i.e. 
( ) jjj hcxmx er ++= L,| . This could invalidate our use of the spatial lags as instruments. However, as the 
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This is fine if we know what variables to include to get rid of ( )ii hcum ,|  and remove 
the residual spatial autocorrelation. The problem with this approach is that it is data intensive, 
and we need some prior assumptions about which amenities are important enough to warrant 
data collection. Moreover, proxying neighbourhood attributes with the characteristics of 
owner-occupying residents will lead to inconsistent estimates, because residents’ 
characteristics are correlated with unobserved determinants of area property prices through 
sorting and selection processes. 
If we do not have this information, the following transformation of (1) is useful. In the 
fashion of a standard fixed effects estimator, we work in deviations from the local spatial 
average of the variables (centred on observation i at coordinate ic ): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )ln ln | , | , | ,i i i i i i i i i iP m P c h ß x m x c h z m z c h vg ¢é ù é ù- = - + - +ë û ë û
 
(3) 
( ) ( ) ( )| , | , | ,i i i i i i i i i ix m x c h z m z c h v m c hd s e e¢é ù- = - + + -ë û  (4) 
 
This transformation gets us out of having to specify a full model of price determinants, 
but means we no longer have a spatial lag instrument for property-specific crimes. One 
possible source of identification would be a second spatial lag of crime rates in equation (2) 
( )ii kcxm ,| , representing spatial impacts at location ic  that operate from distances beyond 
those implied by ( )ii hcxm ,| . The difference ( ) ( )iiii hcxmkcxm ,|,| -  between these spatial 
lagged values of crime rates then provides a suitable instrument. 
Otherwise, an Instrumental Variables procedure requires exclusion restrictions on iz  in 
(3). A plausible candidate instrument is the number of offences reported on non-residential 
properties in the immediate vicinity. To see this, consider a house in a residential street 
located near a parade of retail outlets or other commercial premises. The incidence of crimes 
reported at the commercial premises and the incidence of crimes reported in nearby dwellings 
will be correlated in that the same criminals may be active in both. But the returns to crime in 
each type of premises are plausibly uncorrelated2. There is little reason to believe that 
                                                                                                                                                        
number of observations K included in the weighted average becomes large, the effect of any individual becomes 
negligible, so the estimator is consistent if K is proportional to the sample size. 
2 Once we have removed common factors like the land price. 
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victimisation rates in commercial and residential premises will be related, except through 
shifts in the local supply of crimes. In Section 4.4 we consider another instrument, based on 
the link between alcohol consumption and crime – the distance to the nearest public house or 
wine bar. 
 
2.2. Estimation 
 
We use all the approaches described above to estimate b . Firstly, we use a fairly traditional 
specification with property characteristics, location descriptors and physical attributes of the 
neighbourhood on the right hand side of an OLS regression. Secondly, we use crimes on non-
residential properties as instruments for crimes at or near the property. 
Next, we estimate the model of equation (3). To do this we need first to estimate 
( )ii hcm ,|x , the sample estimates of the expected values of the independent and dependent 
variables at each location. These estimates are just locally weighted averages of the 
neighbouring observations at each data point. Least squares regression using the deviations of 
the variables from these spatially weighted averages then gives estimates of the linear 
parameters, as in (3). Details of the procedure for computing the locally weighted averages 
are presented in Appendix A. Following this, we instrument the deviation of residential 
crimes from their expected values in the surrounding neighbourhood in (3) with crimes in 
other dwellings (in similar local deviation form). 
As final checks, we use distance to nearest public house or wine bar as an instrument, 
then spatial lags of crime, and deviations in spatial lags as instruments. 
 
 
3. Data Sources 
 
3.1. Crime data 
 
Many police forces in the UK record crime at a geographically localised level. However, it is 
nearly impossible to obtain this data at the present time in a form that is useful for mapping to 
other area characteristics and to properties. One exception is the Metropolitan Police Force 
for London, which has made available to us a unique data set recording property-based crime 
on an annual basis for the period April 1999 to March 2001. The numbers of property-based 
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crimes are recorded across the London area on 100m grid references. We have five types of 
crime: Burglary in a Dwelling, Burglary in Other Buildings, Criminal Damage to a 
Dwelling, Criminal Damage to Other Buildings, and Theft from Shops. Criminal damage 
includes graffiti and vandalism, but excludes damage committed in the course of a burglary, 
which would be recorded under burglary (Home Office, 2002). Unfortunately, it seems that 
the Metropolitan Police is unable to Postcode other offences accurately. Only 68% of offence 
locations in all offence categories were post-coded in 1999 (Home Office, 2000). Property 
based crimes are the easiest to Postcode, though no information was available on what 
proportion of recorded property crimes actually appear in our data set. 
These crime statistics are far from perfect for other reasons. It is well known from 
comparison of victimisation surveys and recorded crime statistics that the latter understate the 
true incidence of crime – the so-called dark figure. Unsurprisingly, the probability to report a 
crime varies with the severity of the incidence. More troubling is the fact that the propensity 
to report a crime varies with the characteristics of the victim, so presumably varies over space 
too. Apparently, individuals with a ‘police-neutral’ attitude report only 45% of burglaries 
involving a loss, but without injury or loss of earnings (MacDonald, 2001). More 
encouragingly, the figure rises to nearly 100% for burglaries involving injury and loss of 
earnings. No information is available for reporting rates for Criminal Damage. We also know 
that the police do not record all reported incidents (Home Office, 2000). Some assessment is 
made about whether a crime really took place, and the incident is recorded or not on that 
basis. 
Ultimately, we will have to live with these data problems. No victimisation or other 
crime data exists at sufficient density, or at a useful level of geographical dis-aggregation. It 
is reasonable to assume that the recorded figures in our spatial data set can be treated as an 
index of the geographical distribution of the most serious incidents of property crime. 
 
3.2. Property price data 
 
Our main data source for property transactions is a sample provided by Ekins Surveyors. 
Ekins is the trading name of Woolwich Surveying Services Ltd, a wholly-owned but 
independent subsidiary of Woolwich plc operating in the residential and commercial property 
sectors. In addition to its work with the Woolwich, Ekins receives survey and valuation 
instructions from over 100 other lending organisations. The full sample contains 10464 
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properties in the Inner London Area, covering the E, EC1, N, NW, SE, SW, W, and WC 
Postcode Areas3, surveyed between December 2000 and July 2001. We assign these 
properties to grid references and match in local area data from various sources using the 
address Postcodes. 
Although the sample has a good range of variables characterising the property, many of 
these have missing or implausible zero values. Keeping only those observations with non-
missing data means a massive reduction in sample size. To avoid this, we retain all properties 
with non-missing values for a basic property style/type indicator that takes on ten mutually 
exclusive values. Missing data elements in other characteristics are zero encoded, and a new 
dummy variable generated to indicate missing elements for each characteristic. In a 
regression setting, this takes out mean differences between missing and non-missing groups 
in the data4. Our final sample with matched grid references amounts to around 8100 
properties. 
Our second property price data source is the Government land registry, which we use as 
a comparison sample. This data relates to nearly all post-coded property transactions in 
England and Wales from January 2000 to December 2001. However, it is only available as 
spatially aggregated data at Postcode-Sector level, by four property types: Detached, Semi-
Detached, Terraced, Flat/Maisonette. 
 
3.3. Matching crimes to property locations  
 
Most of the recorded crimes do not match property locations exactly, and it is not the 
intention here to measure attacks on specific properties. Rather, we are interested in obtaining 
a measure of the expected density of crime in the neighbourhood of a property – think of a 
few blocks or streets. For our property level data we calculate the number of crimes of each 
residential crime type recorded within a 250m radius of the property, and the implied density 
of crimes per kilometre squared. For non-residential crimes, we double the distance to 
compensate for the lower density of non-residential properties. When we match to our 
                                                 
3 In the UK, postal addresses are coded hierarchically by Postcode Area, Postcode District, Postcode Sector and 
full Postcode. 
4 We have compared our results with a sample restricted to properties with non-missing observations on number 
of rooms and property style, and find no important differences. 
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Postcode-sector level data, we measure crime density within a 1km radius of the Postcode 
sector centroid. 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1. Summarising and visualising the data 
 
Table 1 summarises the key variables in the property price and crime data. The top panel 
summarises the property valuation sample. The bottom summarises the Postcode-sector based 
data. The mean crime densities are much lower in the latter, because it covers a much wider 
geographical area and because, as we illustrate below, crime rates are lower in the suburbs. 
The focus of our work is on recorded crimes in the categories Burglary in a Dwelling, and 
Criminal Damage to a Dwelling. 
 
Table 1: 
Summary statistics 
 Mean s.d. Min / Max N 
Ekins property valuation data     
Property prices, 12/00-07/01 (£000) 235.4 244.8 14 / 4500 8084 
Criminal damage in a dwelling (km-2) 50.5 30.5 0.63 / 155.8 8084 
Burglary in a dwelling (km-2) 121.6 79.4 1.2 / 565.3 8084 
Eastings 53091 676 51470 / 54840 8084 
Northings 18064 664.6 16690 / 19590 8084 
Land Registry Postcode sector data     
Property prices, 01/99-12/00 (£) 218.2 246.4 37.5 / 9535 5406 
Criminal damage in a dwelling (km-2) 37.8 31.9 0 / 191.3 5406 
Burglary in a dwelling (km-2) 78.8 63.5 0 / 370.2 5406 
Eastings 52926 992 50684 / 55200 5406 
Northings 17911 864 15937 / 19820 5406 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the geographical distribution of these crimes for the London 
area, for the period under study – those crimes recorded from April 1999 to March 2001. The 
maps are constructed by counting crimes within a 1km radius of points on a 500m grid. The 
maps indicate burglary hot-spots north of Islington in North London, and around Brixton in 
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the south. Criminal damage is high in these areas too, but the hot-spots look more dispersed. 
They extend north from Islington up towards Tottenham on the west side of the Lea Valley, 
east into the East End of London, and on the south side of the River Thames towards 
Woolwich. Recorded property crime rates are generally low in the Central London area, rise 
in the inner city areas, and fall away again towards the suburbs. The black polygon illustrates 
the envelope of our property valuation data set. 
Turning now to the property valuation data, Figure 3 shows the distribution of property 
prices over the London sample area. Comparing the maps for crimes and burglaries, we see 
that most of the high-density crime areas are in the east, and outside the highest price districts 
in the west. But this is not the relationship we want to measure. We need to abstract from 
these broad geographical trends. 
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Figure 1:  Incidents of Burglary in a Dwelling per km2, April 1999-Mar 2000 
(regression adjusted for household density) 
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Figure 2:  Incidents of Criminal Damage to Dwellings per km2, April 1999- Mar 2000 
(regression adjusted for household density) 
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Figure 3:  Log Property Prices, First 6 Months of 2001 
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Figure 4:  Residual Log-Property Price Surface 
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Figure 4 presents an estimated contour plot of the residual property price surface from 
our models in the London area, smoothed on to a 500m grid. This is an estimate of the 
function ( )ii hcum ,|  as it appears in (1) (for details of how this is constructed see Appendix 
A). Our semiparametric method in effect removes this spatial variation before estimating the 
linear parameters in the hedonic model. It is quite clear that no parametric function can be 
accurately fitted to this price surface. Any fully parametric property price regression that fails 
to control adequately for this spatial distribution of unobserved price factors will, in principle, 
provide inconsistent estimates of the model parameters. 
 
4.2. Regression results using property level data 
 
Let us begin though with standard OLS log-property price regressions. These results are 
shown in Table 2, Column (1). Explanatory variables are dictated largely by what is available 
in our property data set. Column (1) includes a quadratic in the distance to Soho, London. 
This is an approximation to the Central Business District (CBD)5. The regression includes 
various measures of population and household density to adjust for the fact that we measure 
property crimes on a per-unit-area basis6. Crime density could proxy for housing and 
population density. For presentational reasons we do not report the coefficients on ten 
property style dummies. All the estimated parameters on the property characteristics and 
distance to the CBD seem plausible 7. 
Focussing now on our crime incidence variables, the first coefficients in Column (1) 
suggest a highly significant 3.9% decrease in property prices for an additional 5 reported 
incidents of Criminal Damage per square kilometre per year (10% of the sample mean, or an 
                                                 
5 Including alternative or additional measures – to the City of London, Victoria, or Docklands – made little 
difference to the key results, and introduced collinearity problems. 
6 The alternative approach would be to calculate the impact of crimes per household. This would involve either 
additional computation of the number of households corresponding to our crime density measure, or division of 
the crime density by the housing density. Results based on this approach tend to be highly sensitive to the choice 
of area over which household density is computed, though qualitatively similar to what is presented here.  An 
additional problem occurs, in that we have no sensible denominator for crimes on commercial premises. 
7 The results shown are based on the maximal sample with basic property style indicators and at least some 
information on other characteristics. We zero-encode data elements in the property characteristics set with 
missing values and generate an additional missing data dummy for each variable. 
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expected 1 additional reported incidents per year within a radius of 250m). But, taking the 
results at face value, domestic burglaries appear to push up property values. Following the 
discussion in 2.1, we assume this implausible (in a causal sense) coefficient reflects the 
dependence of property crime victimisation on unobserved property, household and 
neighbourhood characteristics. Higher returns to burglaries in higher-price dwellings, and the 
higher propensity for better-off households to report crime could bias these estimates8. 
Column (2) introduces more neighbourhood and amenity controls. Immediately, the 
coefficient on Criminal Damage is halved and the impact of Burglaries vanishes to 
insignificance. Column (3) instruments crimes on dwellings with the reported incidence of 
Criminal Damage  and Burglaries to other buildings. These IV estimates will be consistent 
even if victimisation rates depend on the characteristics of dwellings or households. In fact, 
the IV point estimate is slightly higher than the OLS estimate, but not significantly so using a 
standard Hausman test of exogeneity ( 583.021 =c , p-value =0.445). 
In any property value model we must worry about the impact of unobserved local 
amenities. Column (4)-(6) present results for our semi-parametric smooth spatial effects 
estimator that allows for unobserved spatially correlated effects on property prices. These are 
just regression estimates obtained after differencing all the variables from their locally 
weighted averages. Allowing for these spatial effects in Column (4) immediately gives 
similar results to the more standard property models in Columns (1)-(3), even though we 
include only the most basic property characteristics. Including a few more neighbourhood 
characteristics – specifically the neighbourhood proportion in social housing – attenuates the 
estimated impact of Criminal Damage slightly. Instrumenting with incidents on buildings 
other than dwellings pushes the coefficients back up. This could be because households in 
higher-price properties have a higher propensity to report acts of criminal damage. The 
recorded crime density is endogenous to property prices, and means the non-IV estimates are 
biased toward finding a positive relationship between incidents and prices. In any case, we 
not reject the equality of the Criminal Damage coefficients in Columns (5) and (6) ( p-
value=0.452 in Hausman test). 
 
                                                 
8 Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) also find a positive, though insignificant association between property crimes 
and property prices in a property value regression. 
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Table 2: 
London property prices and property crimes, 2001 
 No spatial effects Smooth spatial effects  
 OLS OLS IV1 OLS OLS IV2 Mean 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Criminal Damage to 
Dwellings 100s* 
-0.768 
(-14.10) 
-0.422 
(-9.15) 
-0.500 
(-4.45) 
-0.416 
(-6.76) 
-0.310 
(-5.50) 
-0.388 
(-3.26) 
0.51 
Burglary of Dwellings 
100s* 
0.044 
(4.03) 
3.4e-03 
(0.71) 
3.0e-04 
(0.01) 
3.6e-04 
(0.06) 
2.0e-03 
(0.45) 
0.017 
(1.65) 
1.22 
Total rooms in property 0.215 
(25.40) 
0.187 
(27.67) 
0.187 
(27.71) 
0.202 
(29.69) 
0.191 
(28.80) 
0.191 
(28.88) 
3.94 
Total floor area (100m2) 3.11e-04 
(2.86) 
3.6e-04 
(3.73) 
3.7e-04 
(3.74) 
2.8e-04 
(2.91) 
4.3e-04 
(4.29) 
4.1e-04 
(4.30) 
1.49 
Number of floors 0.044 
(2.86) 
0.048 
(4.04) 
0.047 
(3.91) 
0.048 
(3.74) 
0.048 
(4.23) 
0.048 
(4.18) 
1.73 
Age of property 2.1e-03 
(-8.18) 
1.5e-03 
(7.54) 
1.5e-03 
(7.66) 
1.9e-03 
(9.47) 
1.6e-03 
(8.45) 
1.6e-03 
(8.30) 
77.17 
Garage 0.084 
(2.83) 
0.120 
(5.21) 
0.117 
(5.13) 
0.122 
(5.40) 
0.109 
(4.96) 
0.110 
(4.95) 
0.09 
Flat density (1000s/km2) -0.022 
(-4.92) 
-9.7e-03 
(-4.37) 
-0.011 
(-3.35) 
-0.016 
(-5.04) 
-9.2e-03 
(-4.65) 
-8.7e-03 
(-3.35) 
2.48 
Household density 
(1000s/km2) 
0.060 
(5.52) 
0.038 
(5.44) 
0.038 
(5.02) 
0.023 
(3.26) 
0.023 
(4.09) 
0.023 
(4.08) 
5.75 
Population density 
(1000s/ km2) 
-0.028 
(-6.45) 
-0.021 
(-7.17) 
-0.021 
(-6.50) 
-0.014 
(-4.98) 
-0.014 
(-5.58) 
-0.014 
(-5.70) 
12.77 
Distance to Soho (km) -0.161 
(-8.96) 
-0.128 
(-5.45) 
-0.128 
(-5.71) 
- - - 8.90 
Distance to Soho 
squared 
3.6e-03 
(3.52) 
3.1e-03 
(2.67) 
3.0e-03 
(2.64) 
- - - 91.66 
Km to nearest 
Underground station 
- -0.031 
(-3.09) 
-0.031 
(-3.04) 
- -0.017 
(-1.19) 
-0.014 
(-0.91) 
1.59 
Km to nearest council 
office (town centre) 
- -0.028 
(-2.86) 
-0.031 
(-2.91) 
- -0.016 
(-1.01) 
-0.016 
(-1.01) 
2.56 
Km to nearest green 
space 
- -3.4e-03 
(0.32) 
-1.3e-03 
(-0.12) 
- -9.0e-03 
(-0.63) 
-7.1e-03 
(-0.51) 
2.56 
Km to nearest police 
station 
- -6.6e-03 
(0.44) 
-0.013 
(-0.79) 
- -0.018 
(-1.55) 
-0.019 
(-1.57) 
1.08 
Mean rooms in 
neighbourhood 
- 0.086 
(9.07) 
0.083 
(8.47) 
- 0.066 
(8.84) 
0.068 
(9.19) 
4.91 
Neighbourhood social 
housing 
- -0.368 
(-11.33) 
-0.351 
(-11.17) 
- -0.389 
(-12.54) 
-0.388 
(-13.00) 
0.28 
Local Authority 
dummies 
No Yes Yes No No No  
R2 0.400 0.718 0.717 0.556 0.586 0.585  
Sample size 8084 8064 8064 8084 8064 8064  
P-value test of 
restrictions 
- - Not over-
identified 
 - 0.797  
Dependent variable is log property price. Regressions include ten property style dummies, Local Authority area dummies, 
and missing data dummies. t-statistics adjusted for clustering on Census Enumeration Districts. Instruments are: 1. Density 
of criminal damage and burglary in other dwellings; 2. Density of criminal damage and burglary in other buildings, and theft 
from shops. 
*Crime units are crimes per year per km2: April 1999 to Mar 2001. 
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It is worth discussing the effectiveness of our semi-parametric strategy. That it works is 
clear from the coefficients on the distance from local amenities. Distance from London 
Underground stations and distance from Council Offices (a measure of intra-urban centres 
rather than an amenity in its own right) were both significant at around minus 3% per 
kilometre in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. Now they are not. This happens because we are 
effectively exploiting variation relative to surrounding neighbourhoods. Distances to anything 
but immediately proximate amenities will not matter. Working with differences from local 
averages eliminates distance-to-amenity-related variation and reduces the need for this type 
of control9. 
Adding some more community characteristics into the regression, we find few dramatic 
changes. Table 3 presents the main crime coefficients, plus the coefficient on number of 
rooms, for three additional specifications. Including spatially weighted averages of local 
school performance and unauthorised school absences in the regression makes very little 
difference. Controls for ethnicity, education levels and unemployment rates have more of an 
impact, but as we have discussed before, these residential composition variables are likely to 
be endogenous. 
                                                 
9 Because the mean distance from an amenity to houses in a radius around a given house j is a consistent 
estimate of the distance from that amenity to j. If we work with the deviation of distance from local mean 
distance, then only amenities that benefit households because of their immediate proximity will matter in the 
regression: park and riverside locations perhaps. Taking deviations from the local group mean eliminates the 
impact of other local factors. 
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Table 3 
Robustness checks 
 Criminal 
Damage 
Burglary 
of 
Dwellings 
Rooms 
    
Baseline specification, full sample -0.310 
(-5.50) 
8.8e-03 
(0.45) 
0.191 
(28.80) 
Plus performance and absence in nearest 
primary/secondary schools 
-0.294 
(-5.03) 
8.8e-03 
 (0.45) 
0.191 
(28.63) 
Plus higher-educated, black and Indian, 
unemployment rate, average age (1991) 
-0.240 
(-4.33) 
0.013 
(0.69) 
0.191 
(28.57) 
Baseline specification, sample restricted 
to sample with non-missing rooms data 
-0.364 
(-5.34) 
0.016 
(0.57) 
0.170 
(22.31) 
    
Regressions are otherwise as in Table 2, Column (5). 
 
Restric ting the sample to observations with non-missing rooms data gives us a lower 
coefficient on the number of rooms, but increases the measured impact of incidents of 
criminal damage. The impact of burglary rates remains insignificant. We shall take Column 
(5) in Table 2 as the best specification. A 5 crimes per year per km2 increase (+10% at the 
sample mean) in the expected density of reported Criminal Damage pushes property prices 
down by 1.6% ( { } 105.031.0exp -´= ). This is quite a substantial impact considering that 
mean number of incidents is 50, with a standard deviation of 30 incidents per year per km2. 
Treating criminal damage as an index of visible crime, we can say that a one-tenth standard 
deviation increase in crime density leads to a 0.94% decrease in property prices. Interpreting 
the coefficient as an implicit price in a hedonic function gives us a mean implicit price of 
around £2200 for a one-tenth of a standard deviation reduction in Criminal Damage incidents 
the Inner London area. We find no impact from domestic burglary rates, despite carefully 
attention to identification. For interpretation, read Section 4.5. 
We have assumed so far that the response of log property prices to the density of crimes 
is linear. Figure 6 in Appendix C provides and informal check. It plots the deviation of log 
property prices from their locally weighted averages, against the deviation of Criminal 
Damage densities from their locally weighted averages. The relationship is predominantly 
linear. 
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4.3. Regression results using Postcode-Sector level data 
 
The primary results above are based on a sample of property transactions for the inner 
London area only. For comparison purposes, we present similar models using geographically 
aggregated data from the Government Land Registry. This gives near-universal coverage of 
property transactions. Property prices are aggregated by the Land Registry to Postcode-sector 
level for four property types (Flats, Detached, Semi-Detached and Terraced houses) for 
confidentiality reasons. We use Postcode-sectors falling within the envelope of the crime data 
we have for the Metropolitan Police Force in London. This gives us slightly wider 
geographical coverage than our property level data. The 1991 Census provides us with 
information on the average number of rooms for different property types and on other 
Postcode-sector characteristics, analogous to the neighbourhood measures used in Table 2. 
Table 4 presents these results. 
Column (1) is a simple OLS regression. What is clear here is that the Postcode sector 
average data does a pretty good job of measuring the impact of property crimes on property 
prices, taking our results of Table 2, Column (4) as the comparison model. Overall though, 
the coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) mis-measure the implicit prices of a room, and social 
housing relative to our baseline. In Column (3) we work with deviations from locally 
weighted averages of the variables. This puts the implicit prices back in line with the baseline 
model. 
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Table 4 
Postcode Sector Data, 2000-2001 
 No spatial 
effects 
Smooth spatial 
effects 
   
Criminal Damage to Dwellings 100s/km2 -0.262 
(-5.65) 
-0.244 
(-3.86) 
Burglary of Dwellings 100s/km2 0.016 
(0.59) 
-1.5e-04 
(-0.40) 
Mean rooms in neighbourhood 0.311 
(25.59) 
0.198 
(11.79) 
Neighbourhood social housing -0.214 
(-4.38) 
-0.327 
(-6.18) 
Flat density (1000s/km2) -5.4e-03 
(-1.12) 
5.4e-03 
(1.17) 
Household density 
(1000s/km2) 
0.084 
(6.58) 
0.013 
(0.95) 
Population density (1000s/ km2) -0.052 
(-8.87) 
-0.021 
(-3.46) 
Distance to Soho -0.133 
(-19.88) 
- 
Distance to Soho squared 3.0e-03 
(14.00) 
- 
Local authority dummies Yes No 
Sample size 5406 5516 
Dependent variable is log-property price. Regressions include three property style 
dummies, one year dummy, plus constant term. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Comparison of Column (3) in Table 2, and Column (5) in Table 4, suggests that micro-
geographically aggregated data is quite acceptable for the hedonic analysis of neighbourhood 
and property characteristics, provided that we take the trouble to carefully account for 
unobserved neighbourhood effects. 
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4.4. Alternative instruments 
 
In Section 2.1 we suggested using spatial lags of the crime density as instruments for 
neighbourhood crime density, on the assumption that averaged crime rates at some radius10 
from a property or neighbourhood should be unaffected by the characteristics of the property 
or neighbourhood. Using this strategy, we still fail to find any impact from Burglaries in 
Dwellings on property prices. This reinforces the impression that burglary rates really have 
no causal impact. The results are in the top panel of Table  2. Rather than attenuating the  
impact of Criminal Damage, this strategy gives us bigger negative coefficients: –0.664 (–
4.64) using data in levels; –0.680 (–4.02) using the data in deviations from locally weighted 
averages. As we discussed before in Section 4.2, this may be because the higher propensity of 
occupants of higher-price dwellings to report crime attenuates the non-IV coefficient. But it 
may also be because average crime density in the wider geographical area suffers from less 
measurement error and noise than the locally computed crime densities. Instrumenting 
corrects for errors-in-the-variables- induced attenuation. 
Consideration of the possible cultural factors underlying graffiti, vandalism and other 
forms of criminal damage suggest another plausible instrument. Alcohol consumption is an 
associated factor in many types of crime, although the lack of official statistics for the UK 
makes it difficult to quantify the link (Deehan, 1999). A study in one town in England found 
that 88% of people arrested for acts of criminal damage, over a period of five months, had 
been drinking in the four hours prior to the incident (Jeffs and Saunders, 1983). Official 
statistics for local prisons in the United States indicate that 33% inmates convicted for a 
property crime, and some 56% of inmates convicted for a public order offence, had been 
drinking prior to the offence. Of those inmates, around three-quarters had a Blood Alcohol 
Content in excess of 0.10g/dl at the time of the offence (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998). 
Although the link between alcohol consumption and crime is not necessarily directly causal, 
alcohol is often a contributory factor in violent crimes and acts of public disorder. This may 
be because alcohol encourages aggression, induces psychotic states, or decreases inhibitions. 
Or it may be that some certain social environments encourage both excessive drinking and 
disorderly or criminal activity (Deehan, 1999; Bottoms and Wiles, 1997). In any case, a link 
                                                 
10 In practice we use the locally weighted averages computed for each observation as in Section 2.2, but 
excluding any data points within a radius of 1km of the observation. 
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between the location of crimes and the location of licensed premises, and the time of offences 
and the end of licensing hours is widely recognised (Bottoms and Wiles, 1997). 
 
Table 5 
Alternative instruments for criminal damage 
 Criminal Damage 
  
No spatial effects, spatial lags of crime as instruments -0.664 
(-4.64) 
Spatial effects, second spatial lags of crime as instruments -0.680 
(-4.02) 
  
No spatial effects, distance to pub as instruments (cubic)1 -0.582 
(-3.17) 
Spatial effects, distance to pub as instruments (cubic) -0.472 
(-1.92) 
  
Regressions are otherwise as in Table 2. 
IV regressions using pub distance as instruments include public house density as 
additional regressor in property-price equation, to allow for amenity effects. 
Note: 1. The instruments in this model fail the Sargan test for the validity of the 
overidentification (p-value=0.027). All others pass the test at a p-value of 0.200 or 
greater. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we would expect the incidence of property crime in 
our London data to be higher at locations near licensed premises. Indeed this is true. 
Regressing the criminal damage density at each property location on a 3rd-order polynomial 
in distance from the nearest public house or wine bar, we find significant negative impacts 
(F(3,138)=6.43). For the average property, criminal damage density at a property decreases at 
the rate of 3.5 crimes per km2 per year as distance to the nearest pub increases11. In the lower 
panel of Table 5 we employ distance to the nearest licensed premises, and its polynomials as 
instruments for criminal damage in our property price equation. Again, this instrumental-
variables strategy increases the estimated negative impact of criminal damage on property 
values, although the results are not far out of line with the IV estimates in Table 2. The use of 
                                                 
11 Data on pub locations is from the web edition of the Thomson Local Directory, 
http://www.infospace.com/uk.thomw/. This result is based on a regression in deviations-from-spatial-means 
form, with additional controls as in Table  2. 
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distance to nearest licensed premises as an instrument assumes that there is no direct amenity 
value from living close to a pub. This is questionable, though our instruments pass the 
appropriate tests once we allow for general, localised spatial effects. We include local pub 
density as an additional regressor, under the assumption that accessibility to a variety of 
drinking establishments is likely to be more important to consumers than close proximity to 
the nearest. This does have a positive impact on prices in the model with spatial effects – an 
additional 10 pubs or wine bars per km2 increasing prices by 2.8%. 
 
4.5. Interpretation and discussion 
 
Burglaries do not seem to influence property prices, but Criminal Damage incidents do. This 
is, at first, quite surprising. True, home-owners can take preventative action against burglars 
(alarm systems, barriers) but may not be able to prevent damage to property. But we should 
consider to what extent our estimated impact of Criminal Damage to Dwellings picks up the 
cost associated with a high incidence of unobserved crimes – violent crime, robbery, vehicle 
crime for example. 
Our data is slightly limited by the lack of information on crime in other categories. 
Some unobserved crime categories are cause for concern, because the estimates of the 
economic costs of these types of crime are high. Brand and Price (2000) estimate that average 
cost associated with an act of violence against the person is £19000 with serious wounding 
carrying total costs of £130000. For robbery the figure is £9700 per incident. Clearly, we can 
expect the costs associated with increased risk of attack associated with a high persistent high 
local incidence of robbery or violent crime to be capitalised in property values. On the other 
hand, incidents of assault and robbery may be more important in individual choices about 
where and when to walk the streets. The location of property crimes is more directly related 
to choice of residential location.  
Unfortunately there is not much data available that allows us to infer anything about the 
relationship between rates of crimes in different offence categories at a localised geographical 
level in urban areas12. We can do this at a much broader geographical level using recorded 
crime at the Police Force Area level for England and Wales. Police Force Areas correspond 
to Counties, with a few exceptions. Whether the cross sectional relationship tells us much 
                                                 
12 Crime data is collected at Local Authority Level, but not for the Criminal Damage category. 
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about the relationships between types of offences at the neighbourhood level is pretty 
doubtful. Nevertheless, the relationships between year-to-year changes in crime rates within 
Police Force Areas will be informative about the links between different types of criminal 
activity. 
Table 6 reports the coefficients obtained by regressing first differences of various log 
crime rates (crimes per person) within 43 Police Force Areas on the first differences in log 
crime rates for Burglary and Criminal Damage. Year dummies to take out general trends. 
Crimes in nearly all the offence categories are positively correlated with both Criminal 
Damage and Burglary, with elasticities of between 0.1 and 0.5. Looking at the joint 
significance of the coefficients, it seems that only in the case of Robbery and Vehicle Crime 
are these jointly significantly different from zero. There is a relationship too between Sexual 
Crimes and Criminal Damage. The number of total crimes in other categories (excluding 
Criminal Damage, Burglary and Fraud) is quite strongly associated with Criminal Damage 
and Burglary. 
 
Table 6 
Association between year on year changes in Police Force Area crime 
rates, 1997-1999 
 Violent Theft Robbery Sexual 
Criminal damage 0.237 
(1.46) 
-0.011 
(-0.11) 
0.417* 
(2.74) 
0.529* 
(1.98) 
Burglary 0.232 
(1.07) 
0.781* 
(4.74) 
0.500* 
(2.22) 
-0.159 
(-0.54) 
F-test p-value 0.205 0.000 0.004 0.086 
 Vehicle Other Total Excluding vehicles 
Criminal damage 0.376* 
(4.17) 
0.110 
(0.78) 
0.215* 
(3.39) 
0.054 
(0.74) 
Burglary 0.373* 
(2.99) 
0.245 
(1.74) 
0.452* 
(6.86) 
0.598* 
(4.55) 
F-test p-value 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.000 
     
Table shows coefficients and standard errors from regression of first 
differences of various log crime rates for police force areas, on first 
differences of log criminal damage and burglary rates. 
Regressions include year dummies. 
Sample size = 172 
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It seems that similar factors influence criminal activity in the Robbery, Sexual Crimes, 
Vehicle Crimes and Criminal Damage categories, or that the same criminals are active in 
these categories. But once we exclude Vehicle Crimes from Total Crime (Table 6, Column 
(4), bottom panel), the relationship between Total Crime and Criminal Damage disappears. 
We also have some geographically disaggregated crime data for the Derbyshire Police 
Force Area. This police force records crimes at Census Ward level (around 3000 households). 
This is not a metropolitan area, but contains a mixture of urban and rural territories. Here we 
find few significant associations between the annual change in the number of recorded 
incidents Criminal Damage, Burglary and other crime types. Again, Criminal Damage is 
significantly associated with Vehicle Crimes (thefts from and of vehicles) and Burglary, but 
with nothing else. 
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50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
viol sex rob burg theft crim
 
Figure 5:  Crime trends in Metropolitan Police Force Area, 1993-2001 
Changes in counting rules can make comparison between pre and post 1999 figures misleading. 
Figures are adjusted for overall effect on offence groups, but the Theft and Handling group cannot 
be corrected accurately. All vehicle-related crimes (including some criminal damage to vehicles) 
have been deducted from the Theft and Handling category post January 1998. There were also 
minor geographical changes to the Metropolitan Police Force boundary in 2000. 
 
The crime trends for the Metropolitan Police Force Area in Figure 5 also suggest little 
association between criminal activity in the Criminal Damage (crim) category and what we 
would perceive as serious urban crimes such as Violent Crime (viol), and Robbery (rob). 
Whilst recorded crimes in the Burglary, Criminal Damage and Theft categories have been on 
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a general trend down in the last decade, Violent Crime and Robbery have been on the 
increase. 
What then are we to make of our results? On the face of it the impact of Criminal 
Damage on property prices seems high relative to estimates of the direct, physical and 
emotional costs associated with Criminal Damage itself. Average costs per incident to the 
household experiencing it are in the order of £510 (Brand and Price, 2000). In comparison, 
our estimates say that a household is willing to pay something like this to avoid 14 incidents 
of criminal damage in a square kilometre in their neighbourhood13. But a square kilometre in 
Inner London holds, on average, some 2800 households. Based on the average value of an 
incident of criminal damage to the household, these 14 incidents should have an expected 
cost per household in the order of (14 ¸ 2800) ´ £510 = £2.55. By the same calculation, if we 
translate the impact of an increase in the density of crime into an increase in the probability 
of victimisation, our results suggest that the cost of victimisation is over £100000 for an 
incident of criminal damage14. It is quite clear that if incidents of criminal damage affect 
property prices, than it is for reasons other than the expected costs of the incidents 
themselves!  
A more likely explanation is that incidents of vandalism and criminal damage impact 
on property prices because they induce fear of crime. Graffiti, for example, comes out as one 
of the few neighbourhood factors which is consistently significantly correlated with several 
measures of fear of crime (Killias and Clerici, 2000). And yet Criminal Damage rates do not 
seem highly correlated with other types of crime, except Burglary – which we have 
controlled for in our property price regressions – and Vehicle Crime – which again imposes 
relatively low direct and psychological costs. But Criminal Damage is clearly perceived as a 
problem by individuals. In the 2000 British Crime Survey, 32% of respondents agreed that 
vandalism was a ‘very/fairly big problem’ (Home Office, 2001), although only 10% of these 
considered it had a negative impact on their quality of life. Nevertheless, in the same study, 
                                                 
13 The average cost of an additional 14 crimes in one year in one km2 = exp{(0.14´0.310)–
1}´£235000´0.05=£522, assuming the coefficient on crimes in 100s per km2 per year is 0.31, mean property 
price = £235000, discount rate = 0.05 
14 We can translate the impact of crimes per km2 into crimes per household by multiplying by the population 
density, and evaluating a marginal change in crimes per km2. The average cost of one crime in one year in one 
km2 = £37 (same assumptions as above). So average cost of a crime per household in an average area of 1km2  
containing 2800 households is 2800´ £37» £104000. 
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between 33% and 50% of respondents in owner-occupier neighbourhoods consider that 
disorder in general has a negative impact on quality of life and one in five respondents in 
affluent owner-occupier neighbourhoods perceive high levels of disorder. 
Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of our results is that incoming residents 
perceive Criminal Damage in the neighbourhood as signalling higher crime in the area, or 
deteriorating neighbourhood in general. In essence, what we are finding relates to 
neighbourhood effects of the type described by Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Window 
Syndrome (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). According to this hypothesis – popular in the 
environmental criminology literature and with advocates of neighbourhood cleanup 
campaigns 15 – unrepaired damage to property in the neighbourhood encourages further 
vandalism, perceptions of community disorganisation, upward spiralling crime rates and 
downward spiralling neighbourhood status. If vandalism and graffiti are seen as predictors of 
neighbourhood decline and precursors of escalating crime rates, then it is not surprising that 
we see them impacting in property prices. Neverthe less, our evidence is that these disorder-
related crimes are weakly to moderately associated with more serious crimes, suggesting – 
like Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) – that the disorder-crime link is not necessarily causal. 
Physical disorder like graffiti and vandalism may be symptomatic of deeper disruptions in 
social cohesion and community expectations – what Sampson and Raudenbush call 
‘collective-efficacy’. 
We should also recognise that vandalism, graffiti and other forms of criminal damage 
are some of the most visible urban crimes. Uncleaned graffiti and unrepaired damage in the 
environment is hard to conceal from prospective house purchasers. Whilst sellers may have 
private information about local incidents of other crimes – by personal victimisation, word of 
mouth or ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ newsletters – this information is most likely unavailable 
prospective home-buyers. In London, information on neighbourhood crime rates is not 
readily available to the general public. This asymmetry in information means that the hedonic 
price function does not correctly reveal preferences over most types of crime. Hard-to-
observe crimes will have a weak impact on property prices. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Almost all citations on the web are on community web-sites in the US, encouraging neighbours to clean up 
their lots. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
We have estimated the impact of recorded crimes in the Criminal Damage to Dwellings and 
Burglary in Dwellings categories on property prices in the London area, paying careful 
attention to identification issues. Crimes in the first category – including vandalism, graffiti 
and arson – have a significant negative impact on prices. Burglaries have no measurable 
impact on prices, even after allowing for the potential dependence of burglary rates on 
unobserved property characteristics. A one-tenth standard deviation increase in the recorded 
density of incidents of criminal damage has a capitalised cost of just under 1% of property 
values, or £2200 on the average Inner London property in our sample 2001. In annual terms, 
this is around £110 per year per household. Aggregating up to some £340 million per year for 
all 3.1 million households in the London region. This is a huge impact. By comparison the 
Safer Communities Initiative offers Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships in the 
London region16 a total of 3.7 million for 2002/2003 (Home Office, 2001), or around £1.40 
per household. Our Instrumental Variables estimates, using a variety of alternative 
instruments, suggest the figure may be even higher. 
It is, on the face of it, surprising that prices respond more to acts of criminal damage 
than to burglaries given the apparent physical and emotional costs. The explanation we offer 
here is that vandalism and graffiti are important factors motivating fear of crime in the 
community, even though the evidence here suggests that these types of crimes are not 
strongly correlated with incidents of a more serious nature. More generally, graffiti and 
vandalism may be taken as signals or symptoms of community instability, disorder, lack of 
social cohesion and neighbourhood deterioration in general. 
                                                 
16 The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act established partnerships between the police, local authorities, probation 
service, health authorities, the voluntary sector, and local residents and businesses. 
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Appendix A: Computing Locally Weighted Averages 
 
This Appendix describes how we compute the locally weighted averages of each variable x  
and so estimate ( )ii hcm ,|x . We define: 
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where ( )×f  is the standard normal density function. This means we are using a Gaussian 
kernel or distance decay function to weight neighbouring observations. Parameter k  sets the 
maximum distance to the neighbouring observations that will used to compute these local 
weighted averages. Our estimator of ( )ii hcm ,|x  is thus a kernel-weighted nearest neighbour 
smoother. This is a variation on the Smooth Spatial Effects Estimator of Gibbons and Machin 
(2001). 
Note that the choice of k  determines the degree of smoothing. This defines how wide 
the neighbourhood is over which we compute the locally weighted averages. A higher value 
of k  implies generates a longer spatial lag. The choice of k  is somewhat arbitrary, but was 
found to make little difference in practice over a moderate range. Our baseline choice of k  is 
such that the spatially weighted mean explains around one third of the variation in property 
prices, as measured by the 2R  in a regression of iPln  on ( )iii hcPm ,|ln . 
 
 
Appendix B: Constructing the Land Price Surface 
 
Figure 4 illustrates an estimated residual land price surface for the Inner London area. This is 
an estimate of ( )hcum g ,| , the expected value of the residuals from the property price equation 
at map grid points gc , with a fixed smoothing parameter h . To obtain this map, we first 
- 31 - 
estimate the model in equation (3) to obtain estimates of the linear parameters b , g . Note 
now that 
 
( ) [ ]giiig czxPEhcum |ln,| gb ¢-¢-=  (8) 
 
So we then compute the residuals iii zxP gb ¢-¢-ln . Next we calculate the locally 
weighted averages of these residuals within 2.5km of each map grid point, using a Gaussian 
distance decay function (or kernel). 
 
 
Appendix C: Linearity of the Crime-Price Function 
 
Kernel regression, bw = .15, k = 6
Grid points
-.989107 .843249
-.14735
.264808
 
Figure 6: Association between local deviations in Criminal Damage density and local 
deviations in log property prices 
Figure shows kernal regression of log prices (vertical axis) on incidents of Criminal Damage to Dwellings in 
100s per km2 (horizontal axis). Variables are in the form of deviations from local means. Kernel is 
Epanechnikov, bandwidth 0.15 
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